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ONE GREEN AMERICA:
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ENVIRONMENTAL FEDERALISM IN THE UNITED
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David A. Dana*

INTRODUCTION
What should the role of the federal government, and federal law,
be with respect to the environment? Should environmental law be an
essentially federal domain, with the federal government setting the
standards or at least minimum standards for environmental quality
and natural resource protection? Should there be, in other words, a
single "Green America," an America with a singular legal
commitment on air, water, wetlands, species diversity, and climate
change from sea to shining sea? Or should the environmental realm
be, like so many other realms of American life, one where it really
does and should make a huge difference, in terms of law and policy
and their implementation - whether one is speaking of rural
Louisiana or urban Massachusetts or Wyoming or New Jersey?
These questions have been forcefully debated since before there
was much in the way of federal environmental law, and the debaters
have not mellowed. Intense calls for stronger, more comprehensive
federal environmental standards and resource protection continue to
be made, as do calls for the abolition of the federal tyranny
supposedly embodied in the federal EPA, an agency that, if its critics
were to be believed, has more power than the rest of the entire federal
government. My goal in this Essay is not to try to answer the
question whether we should aim for a singular Green America or
what that would actually entail. Instead, I want to address somewhat
"easier" questions. First, why is it that the debate over environmental
federalism seems so muddled, confused and perplexing? My quick
answer here is that what is encompassed in the "environment" and
* Stanford Clinton, Sr. and Zylpha Kilbride Clinton Research Professor of Law,
Northwestern University School of Law.
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"environmental protection" is so multi-faceted and complicated, as
well as so context-specific, that general discussions of environmental
federalism either seem too sparce and theoretical to be of use in
thinking about the real world or too contingent and "messy" to look
like a theory or even a rule-of-thumb guidepost. Second, what
continuities and discontinuities have there been over the last twenty
years or so in the debate over environmental federalism? Here. I
identify and address just a few: (1) the continuity of judicial
unhelpfulness in facilitating federal involvement where the case for
such involvement is absolutely the most compelling, namely in
addressing clear, measurable interstate externalities or spillovers; (2)
the ongoing special and intriguing role of California as the national
laboratory for technologies and practices that might be suitable for
acceptance and implementation at the national scale; (3) the arguable
discontinuity that climate change has now arrived in its palpable
effects and climate change adaptation is thus now (perhaps) finally a
national focal point; and (4) finally, the possible discontinuity of
increased ideological and partisan polarization in the United States, at
the same time as intranational migration, immigration and
urbanization may be lessening some regional differences.
I.

THE MUDDLE OF TALKING AND THEORIZING ABOUT
ENVIRONMENTAL FEDERALISM

We have to begin with what is encompassed in the concept of the
"environment," something which has not been a constant. The
beginning of federal enviromnental law has been framed as two
branches. First, the pollution control/public health/prevention-ofdeath-and-disease branch, what I will call "the pollution control
branch." The second is the natural resource conservation, trees and
campers and Theodore Roosevelt branch, which I will call the
"conservation" branch. The Natural Resources Defense Council
("NRDC") is the go-to environmental NGO for the pollution control
branch, whereas it is National Wildlife Fund and Sierra Club for the
conservation branches, if you will. In reality, the two branches
intersect often, even continually: clean water in a river is a natural
resource and the pollution of the river is a potential conservation
threat and a threat to human health if the river has pathways into
human consumption. An endangered species is a natural resource but
also something that may have important implications for medical
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treatment. Still, there are these two branches that are conventionally
understood, and even enshrined, in law school textbooks and
curricula.
In the pollution control branch, a central focus has been on air and
emissions of air pollutants. In both the pollution control and
conservation branches, there has been a long focus on water,
especially surface water, rivers, lakes, and oceans. An obvious
feature of air and at least some water is that it moves across political
boundaries such as county and state lines. The emissions of
pollutants crossing state boundaries or polluted water travelling
downstream is the paradigmatic case on which there is the broadest
normative agreement for a leading role for federal environmental law
and governance. Indeed, obvious, readily identifiable cross-boundary
transport of indisputably harmful pollutants via water and air is an
area where even those theorists and commentators who are highly
critical of the federalization of environmental governance see an
appropriate role for the federal government. According to the
Matching Principle, as it was coined by Jonathan Macey and Henry
Butler,I the legal response to an environmental problem should be
matched to its physical scale. With physically localized problems, the
response should be local, as it is local people who will bear the costs
and benefits of the environmental problem and any response to it.2
But with problems that scale over boundaries - pollution exported
over state lines - the people in the jurisdiction creating and exporting
the pollution lack an adequate incentive to abate it and hence a
federal solution may be, indeed almost certainly is, optimal.
The Matching Principle is easily deconstructed to the point where,
in practice it offers no particularly determinative guidance. To start
1. See Jonathan R. Macey & Henry N. Butler, Externalities and the M1atching
Principle: The Case for Reallocating Environmental Regulatory Authority., 14
YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 23, 25 (1996).

2. A sophisticated elaboration and defense of this approach is developed by
Richard Revesz, who begins with a premise along the lines of the Matching
Principle and then suggests that not much in the way of deviation from that
principle can be justified on the basis of the rationales for federal authority that
have been asserted. See generally Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Interstate
Environmental Externalities, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2341 (1996); Richard L. Revesz,
Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the Race-To-The-Bottom
Rationale for Federal EnvironmentalRegulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210 (1992);
James E. Krier, On The Typology Of Uniform Environmental Standards In A
FederalSystem -And Why It Matters, 54 MD. L. REV. 1226 (1995).
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with, the Matching Principle relies on the ability to distinguish
between localized pollution phenomena and ones that cross state
boundaries. But making such distinctions often requires information
that is not available, and with better information, more transboundary
connections often become apparent. It is truism in ecology that
everything is connected to everything and, to the extent that is so,
pollution in one jurisdiction is invariably to some extent connected to
environmental conditions in others. For example, some
commentators have suggested that because the water, air, and soil
pollution from a fracking site generally will be localized, state or
local regulation is appropriate, rather than federal regulation.3 But
given the wide geographic scale of fracking, and the cumulative
pollution that may well result from this massive undertaking,
extraboundary transport of pollution in one form or another seems
likely, at least to some extent.4
The Matching Principle becomes even less helpful when we step
away from its assumption that, as a normative matter, what is optimal
is what the aggregate of individual welfare functions tells us is
optimal. The Principle is largely uninformative in a more expansive
nonnative universe. When President Obama invoked a one America,
not a Blue or Red one, what he was invoking was the idea that
America as a collective - a national project - stands for certain
values; that there are certain shared nonnative commitments as to
what residence and/or citizenship should mean for every American.5
3. See, e.g, David Spence, Federalism, Regulatory Lags and the Political

Economy of Energy Production, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 431, 483 (2012). For a very
helpful overview of state regulatory responses and variations among them, see
generally Hannah Wiseman, FracturingRegulation Applied, 22 DUKE ENVTL. L. &
POL'Y F. 361 (2012).

4. See Michael Burger, Fracking and Federalism Choice: In Response to
David B. Spence, Federalism, Regulatory Lags, and the Political Economy of
Energy Production., 161 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfin?abstract id=2190445.
5. See Barack Obama's Remarks to the Democratic National Convention,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Jul.
27,
2004),
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/07/27/politics/campaign/27TEXTOBAMA.htinl?pagewanted=I ("The pundits., the pundits like to slice-and-dice our
country into Red States and Blue States; Red States for Republicans, Blue States
for Democrats. But I've got news for them, too. We worship an awesome God in
the Blue States, and we don't like federal agents poking around in our libraries in
the Red States. We coach Little League in the Blue States and yes, we've got some
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To take an extreme example, even if slavery in one state had only
localized physical or economic effects and no such effects on other
states, no one would question that federal law and federal values
should intervene to extinguish it, and not just because the constitution
as amended now says so. The recent debate over so-called Obamacare is in a sense about the question whether we have or should have
a shared national value and normative commitment to the proposition
that every American should live with some significant access to
health care. The debate was not just a debate over whether the actions
or inactions of people in, for example, New Hampshire or Colorado
affect the health care options and costs of people in, for example,
Florida or Pennsylvania (although it was also that). It was about, in
part, what kind of care people should be able to receive as
Americans, regardless of where they currently live or may come to
live. Similarly, the question of minimum standards for pollution
control, and environmental health, can be seen as a question of what
sort of environmental welfare we as Americans believe is a
fundamental American value or commitment that should not be
contingent on state or county location. Since we as a nation are so
unsure about even the provision of basic health care, it may be
unsurprising that no consensus exists as to the national normative
commitment to environmental welfare as an individual "right."
When one moves from the pollution control discourse to the
discourse of conservation, the Matching Principle seems even less
tenable, as we are left with many, and largely highly contextual,
questions the Principle cannot answer. First off, there is the question
of what counts as a "natural resource" worthy of consideration for
conservation, preservation, sustainable management or whatever term
that one wants to use for something other than open exploitation.
Second, there is the question of what kind of value makes the
resource worth conserving or preserving. Is it use value, option value,
or simple existence value? 6 Whatever the nature of the value, even
resources wholly located within a single state may matter greatly gay friends in the Red States. There are patriots who opposed the war in Iraq and
there are patriots who supported the war in Iraq."); see also Barack Obana's
Keynote Address at the 2004 Democratic National Convention, PBS (Jul. 27,
2004), available at http://www.pbs.orgnewshour/bb/politics/julv-decO4/obamakeynote-dnc.html?print.
6. See generally David A. Dana, Existence Value and Federal Preservation
Regulation.,28 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 343 (2004).
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and in that sense affect the welfare - of Americans in every state.
Old growth forests in Washington or Oregon matter to New Yorkers
because they may want to visit them, because they see them as
beautiful and special even without visiting them, and because they
understand them to provide unique habitat that both normatively
should be preserved for its own sake and that offers genetic and
ecological diversity that may have unknown, more "concrete" use to
them and future generations. And yet such resources are indeed
physically located in particular states and their conservation or nonconservation may have the most obvious, most direct, most readily
verifiable and measurable consequences on the people living near
them.
Whether out-of-staters have a legitimate stake in natural resources
- whether and when and to what extent there is a national or federal
claim on a resource located in a single-state - has no obvious answer.
Almost everyone would agree that there are some such resources, but
what is and is not on the list and the applicable criteria in each case
invariably has been and will be a matter of contention. We see such
contention pointedly when the federal government moves to
designate critical habitat for an endangered species or when there is a
move to classify land as a federal monument or federal wilderness, as
was the case with President Clinton's designation of Utah's Grand
Staircase as a federal monument. But the broader question, beyond
these particular cases, is what counts as the national or federal
patrimony or endowment of natural resources that all Americans
have a legitimate right to see preserved. Even when an area has been
designated as federal wilderness, these debates continue, as we see
with the tension between the views of many Alaskans and Alaskan
politicians about oil exploration and exploitation in the Arctic
National Wildlife Refuge ("ANWR") and the opposing views of
many enviromnentalists and others who live a great physical distance
from Alaska.
The simple theory that local matters should be dealt with locally
and national or transboundary ones nationally does not get as far at
all with respect to either pollution control or conservation questions.
7. See Amy O'Donoughue., Ruling Rejects Local Opposition to Grand
Staircase Plan, available at DESERET NEWs
(Apr.
14, 2009),
http://www.deseretnews.com/article/705297252/Ruling-rejects-local-opposition-toGrand-Staircase-plan. htm l?pg all.
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Moreover, there is the reality that, even if in theory local residents
should decide localized enviromnental questions, state and local
governments sometimes do not produce polices that track their
residents' genuine interests or preferences. This reality further
complicates the question of when there should be federal law and
governance. It is certainly true, as Richard Revesz has argued, that
state and local governments are not always prone to public choice
pathologies, or even necessarily more prone than the federal
government.8 But certain state and local governments in certain cases
arguably are "captured" or institutionally underdeveloped so that they
cannot reasonably reflect residents' interests and protect them. As
compared to the federal government, some state and local
governments simply lack capacity regarding highly technical
environmental questions or the ability to quickly build such capacity.
The response of certain states and their localities to the fracking
revolution, I would argue, should remind us that the limits of state
institutional capacity sometimes justifies a federal role, if only as a
transitional force while states individually and collectively develop
adequate institutional capacity to address new technological practices
and assess new environmental issues.9
When an environmental issue should be a federal issue, then, is
question with no easy, catch-all, Matching-Principle answer. And the
highly contextual, multifaceted, complicated approaches advocated

8. See generally Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Environmental
Regulation: A Public Choice Analysis, 115 HARV. L. REV. 553 (2001). It is also
true that mere invocation of "race to the bottom" does not mean that states provide
less environmental protection than is in some theoretical sense optimal. But even
within the logic of conventional neoclassical economics, there are reasons to
suppose that interstate competition for mobile capital sometimes produces sub-

optimal levels of state regulation. For a lucid treatment, see Wallace E. Oates, A
Reconsideration of Environmental Federalism, RESOURCE FOR THE FUTURE 7
(Nov. 2001), available at www.rff.org/documents/RFF-DP-0 1-54.pdf.
9. For an interesting historical treatment focusing on the period before the

enactment of major statutes, see generally William L. Andreen, Of Fables and
Federalism: A Re-Examination Of The Historical Rationale For Federal
EnvironmentalRegulation.,42 ENVTL. L. 627 (2012). See generally Inessa Abayev,
Hydraulic Fracturing W1astewvater: Making the Case for Treating the
Environmentally Condemned, 24 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 275 (2013) (discussing
bydrofackirg arnd the negative results o.

"wase

or flowback, on the

environment, while offering alternative ways to change the problem through
federal regulations.)

110

FORDHAM ENVIRONIENTAL LA W REVIEW

[VOL. XXIV

by a number of excellent legal scholars in recent years, including, for
example, Dan Esty, Kirsten Engel, David Adelman, and William
Buzbee reflect that reality.' 0 Moreover, the law on the ground reflects
that complicated, muddy, opaque reality. Some natural resources are
treated as principally owned and managed by the states, such as,
wildlife, for example. But that is not so with wildlife where federal
the Endangered Species Act ("ESA") or federal Clean Water Act
("CAA") jurisdiction is implicated, which is a potentially huge
category of cases.' However in practice, we know that wxhen the
federal government does and does not do such things as list species
as endangered and habitats as critical it has a good deal to do with
state and local politics. The inability of anyone, agencies or courts, to
set intelligible lines - as to the statutory, let alone constitutional,
reach of federal jurisdiction over navigable waters - is another
testament to the difficulty of drawing clear federal/not federal lines.' 2
The best illustration of the (understandable) lack of clear lines in
environmental governance is the dominant "cooperative federalism"
model for pollution control whereby the federal government sets
standards and states set (in theory additional and not conflicting)
standards when they choose to or when they are allowed to, which is
much of the time but not always. The states, on the other hand,
enforce the federal and state standards, and often act more or less
vigorously than the federal regulators say they would like, and often
engage in coordination with federal regulators but, sometimes open
conflict, from time to time even litigation.1 3 There are, in this
reasonably stable if not ftlly rationalized or harmonious relationship,
threatened federal sanctions and a few real ones. In all this, states end
10. See generally Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95
MicH. L. REV. 570 (1996); David E. Adelman & Kirsten H. Engel, Adaptive
Federalism: The Case Against Reallocating Environmental Regulatory Authority,
92 MiNN. L. REV. 1796 (2008); William W. Buzbee, Contextual Environmental
Federalism, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L. J. 108 (2005).
11. See, e.g., J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, The CongressionalCompetition to
Control Delegated Power, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1443, 1447-48 (2003) (describing
"backdoor federalism" whereby members of Congress influence Endangered
Species administrative decisions that would affect their state).
12. See, e.g., the variety of views and indeterminate tests set forth by the
Justices in Rapanos v. UnitedStates, 547 U.S. 715 (2006).
13. For a thoughtful recent discussion, see Robert L. Glicksman, From
Cooperative to Inoperative Federalism: The Perverse Mutation of Environmental
Law and Policy, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 719, 781-86 (2006).
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up having huge influence over the as applied substance and as
applied actual enforcement of enviromnental law, but it can be next
to impossible to say how much and what is due to federal initiative
and pressure and what is due to state choice and intent. It has been
noted that this kind of cooperative federalism may lessen govermnent
accountability. States can blame the feds and the feds can point to the
states as the front-line decision maker. But I think our cooperative
federalism is not being used as a mechanism to avoid accountability;
the blurring of federal and state lines is necessary and appropriate.
There are arguable federal and state interests at stake in almost every
environmental issue and problem, and it therefore makes sense that
both the federal and state governments are active in formulating the
response at both a formal and practical level. Any confusion is the
result of the fact that we do not live in the simple world of the
Matching Principle or other parsimonious models of optimal
environmental federalism.
II. THE CONTINUING IRONIES OF THE EASIEST CASES BEING
HARDEST, AND COURTS IMPEDING STATE INTERESTS IN THE NAME
PROTECTING AND RESPECTING STATE INTERESTS

OF

One of the notable ironies of American enviromnental federalism
is that the federal government has been relatively inactive and
relatively ineffectual in addressing palpable, physically measurable,
obviously hannful interstate externalities in the form of exported
pollution, and relatively more effective regarding ostensibly more
local (in a physical sense anyway) pollution.14 And yet it is the
obvious exporting of pollution with obvious health effects that is the

14. See Revesz, supra note 2, at 2344 (". . . the Clean Air Act

the statute

designed to deal with the pollution that gives rise to the most serious problems of
interstate externalities-has been unsuccessful at forcing the internalization of
interstate externalities. Its core provisions cannot be justified by the need to control
interstate externalities, and may have exacerbated the problem. Similarly, the
relatively minor provisions directed at controlling interstate externalities have been
whollv ineffective, largely as a result of the failure of the Environmental Protection
Agency ("EPA") and the federal courts to define a coherent and logical body of
law. In fact, despite congressional preoccupation with the problem and the
existence of statutory provisions expressly designed to correct it, the downwind
states have always been unsuccessful at constraining upwind pollution. A similar
situation arises under the Clean Water Act.").
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case everyone agrees is the easiest one to justify a role for federal law
and regulation.
It took decades for Congress to act to address the interstate transfer
of sulfur dioxide and the attendant problem of acid rain. And even
after the 1990 amendments to the CAA, EPA has been relatively
timid and ineffective with respect to pollution exports.' 5 In the
context of water, Congress and federal agencies have not been
effective in trying to address the exported "pollution" (if you will) of
the Great Lakes by invasive species migrating up the Mississippi.16
The political economy of this irony - why the federal law and
agency action is relatively thin when one region clearly is exporting
some of its pollution to another - has not been fully explored. It may
have to do with the fact that, in our Congressional system, and
especially with the Senate, a geographic region that sees almost only
costs and no benefits from a federal legal intervention is well-poised
to block it. Our federal legislative and regulatory system is filled with
veto points, some explicit and others de facto. With transboundary
pollution within the United States, the polluting regions' businesses
and residents may see relatively little in the way of benefits, whereas
with federal responses to pollution with much more obvious localized
effects, there may be more visible local benefits in addition to local
costs, and that may translate into more state and local support for
federal regulation or at least less resistance. It also may be true that
because it will always be somewhat contestable at the margin how
much pollution in a region is locally produced and how much is the
result of transboundary exports from another region, there is always a
possible technical objection to addressing such transboundary
exports.
Given this irony - that it is more difficult seemingly for the federal
system to address the kind of enviromnental phenomena that
everyone theoretically agrees is more properly the subject of federal
attention than other kinds of more localized environmental
15. See generally Thomas 0. McGarity, EPA At Helm 's Deep: Surviving the
Fourth Attack on Environmental Law, 24 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 205 (2013)

(arguing that during the first two years of the Obama Administration, EPA seized
the offensive, however, the forces of environmental progress were pushed back by
an unanticipated fourth assault from the business community).
16. See, e.g., Jane Cynthia Graham, Snakes on a Plane, or in a Wetland:
Fighting Back Invasive Nonnative Animals - ProposingA Federal Comprehensive
Invasive Nonnative Animal Species Statute.,25 TUL. ENVTL. L. J. 19, 22 (2011).
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phenomena - one might think that the federal courts, acting helpfully,
would encourage or at least not erect obstacles when Congress and
federal agencies do take action to address transboundary pollution of
an obvious, and obviously harmful, sort. But that brings us to the
second irony - federal courts, responding to suits brought by or
supported by the polluting states, have, in the name of state interests
and federalism, made it their business to impede such federal
solutions, even though such solutions not only are theoretically the
most readily justified of federal interventions but also undertaken in
the service of state interests, specifically the interests of the states on
the receiving end of pollution crossing state boundaries.
To see the continuity in this respect over the last few decades,
compare two decisions: New York v. United States, from 1992,17 and
the very recent DC Circuit decision in EME Homer City.18 New York
addressed a transboundary pollution problem, one rooted in the
disposal of low-level radioactive waste. All states were generating
significant such waste but not providing for storage facilities for it,
but instead exporting to just a few sites. The receiving states in turn
were becoming aggrieved, and threatening to close or limit their
facilities, and there was broad recognition, as reflected by an
agreement of all the states as part of an initiative of the National
Governors Association ("NGA"), that some sort of cooperative
solution was required to prevent one or two states from being
overwhelmed with such waste and/or for there to be inadequate
capacity anywhere within the United States. At the behest of the
NGA, Congress enacted the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Act,
which provided a series of encouragements/sanctions to persuade
states, facing localized opposition to in-state storage of the waste, to
develop their own storage capacity and/or enter into interstate
compacts with another state regarding receipt and storage of waste.
One of the sanctions for states that simply refused to take action for
years was that the state, as a state, would be deemed to have taken
title to the low-level radioactive waste generated within the state.
In a now-famous opinion authored by Justice O'Connor, this
provision was struck down as violating the federalism-protective
17. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 145 (1992) (invalidating the Take
Title portion of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Act).
18. EME Homer City Generation, L.P. v. E.P.A., 696 F.3d 7, 12 (2012)
(vacating the Transport Rule).

114

FORDHAM ENVIRONIENTAL LA W REVIEW

[VOL. XXIV

principle that the federal government cannot "commandeer" state
governments implement federal policy. 9 Justice White, in dissent,
found an irony in the Court undermining a "cooperative federalism"
solution to local problems crafted by the states acting cooperatively,
through an organization of locally-elected officials, whereas, under
the Court's reasoning Congress could bypass the states altogether and
directly regulate disposal of low-level radioactive waste. Justice
White was correct to identify an irony in Justice O'Connor's
approach, but I think the irony was not quite what he saw. The
problem of disposal of low-level radioactive waste was not (and still
is not) simply a local one, but rather one of seeing that transboundary
exports, which are inevitable to a degree, are done in an
environmentally and politically sustainable way. The principal
problem with Justice O'Connor's approach was not that it privileged
and hence encouraged more direct, heavy-handed federal regulation,
as Justice White suggested, but rather that it impeded any federal
response at all in a context where the case for federal intervention
was theoretically very strong (that is, transboundary pollution) but
the federal politics corresponding to such transboundary pollution
was not conducive to effective federal action.
Fast forward several decades and one sees another opinion
motivated explicitly by federalism concerns that, in reality, impedes
federal efforts to protect some states from pollution exported by
others after years of effort to convince the exporting states to act on
their own and after huge investments in time and political capital by
federal regulators to produce what appeared to be a workable rule.
Issued pursuant to the so-called Good Neighbor provision of the
CAA, EPA's Transport Rule was designed to curb conventional air
pollution from coal-fired plants that was crossing state boundaries
and contributing to unacceptably high pollution levels in upwind
states. EPA had been urging downwind states to address this
pollution in their state implementation plans for years and had in
effect put upwind states on notice that their state implementation
plans ("SIPs") were inadequate for that reason, and thus EPA
proposed in its rule to move ahead with federal implementation plans
19. See generally, New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992). For a
critique of the rationale for the anti-commandeering principle, see David A. Dana,
The Case For U1nfitnded Environmental Mandates, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1. 8-10
(1995).
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("FIPs"), which given the near certainty that downwind states would
not address transboundary pollution in their SIPs, represented the
only approach that could work to effect a stated legislative goal
whose achievement was long overdue.
Nonetheless, applying a kind of technical strict scrutiny, ignoring
the fact that petitioners had not properly made their current technical
objections to the agency as part of the administrative proceedings,
and expounding a deep solicitude for federalism generally and the
downwind states in particular, Judge Kavanaugh, writing for the
majority, held that the Transport Rule was invalid because it might
impose burdens on downwind states out of proportion with their
contribution to pollution level in upwind states, and because it did not
grant downwind states an opportunity to implement the pollution
limits in the Rule through SIPs before EPA moved on to issuing
FIPs. As Judge Rogers wrote in a powerful dissent, the majority's
approach ignored precedent and principles of deference, and the long
history of EPA's cajoling and warning and cajoling again the
downwind states to address transboundary pollution. The majority
opinion reads as an ode to federalism, but just as Congress in the
Low-Level Radioactive Waste Act was acting on behalf of states in a
paradigm case for federal intervention, so too EPA in the Transport
Rule was promoting the interest of states - the valid interest not to be
subjected to pollution from other states - and indeed, playing the role
a federal government should even under a restrictive reading of the
Matching Principle. 20

20. The courts have not only impeded Congress and federal agencies when they
take action to address interstate externalities but also have avoided using the federal
common law to push action where Congress or agencies have not acted. Consider,
in this regard, Michigan v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, No. 10 C 4457, 2012 WL
6016926 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 3, 2011), regarding the threat of invasive species from the
lower Mississippi and barge traffic for the Great Lakes. Admittedly, however,
public nuisance is a crude tool for resolution of complex environmental problems,
and so one risk for courts in embracing public nuisance as a means of encouraging
federal legislative or regulatory action is that such action won't happen and the
courts will be left in a legislative/regulatory role they understandably do not want.
See David Dana, The Alismatch Between Public Nuisance Law and Global
W1arming, 18 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 9, 21 (2010).
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III. CALIFORNIA As NEITHER GREEN AMERICA NOR JUST ANOTHER
STATE. BUT RATHER As A BRIDGE To GREEN AMERICA

In the literature on federalism, there is a tendency to think of "the
states" as a single category on the one hand and the federal
government on the other. There are not some lesser or greater states,
and indeed, the quasi-sovereignty of Rhode Island or Montana, with
very small populations, is the same as that of California or New
York, with very large ones.21 But at least in the environmental
domain, California has had a distinctive, special role, both by virtue
of Congress extending it special treatment under the CAA and by
virtue of its market size and what its people and state government
have repeatedly shown they are willing and able to undertake.
The special role of California is best understood in the context of
Brandeis' famous "Laboratories of Democracy" description of states
in our federal system. In the Laboratories of Democracy vision, the
various states experiment with solutions to problems and the best
approaches that emerge then can be taken on by the federal
governnent and nationalized or copied by other states. One
constraint of the Laboratories vision is that one needs one or more
states that have the capacity and willingness to experiment and to do
so in a way that can convincingly teach the rest of the nation.
Another constraint is that multiple experimentation can be costly for
businesses and regulated entities that must struggle with multiple
standards, and it may produce results that are too complex, and not
obviously comparable, and result in indecision as to what was
learned overall from experimentation. Sometimes, in effect, less is
more.

Enter California. In the 1990 amendments to the CAA, Congress
designated California as a state allowed to experiment with car
standards that are stricter than federal standards and allowed the
California approach to be de facto nationalized by allowing opt ins
by other states.22 Congress thus balanced the need for state
21. For a critique of this approach, see David A. Dana, Democratizingthe Law
of Federal Preemption, 102 Nw. U. L. REV. 507, 511-13 (2008).
22. For a history of the interplay between California's state emissions standards
and federal emissions standards, see Ann E. Carison, Iterative Federalism and
Climate Change, 103 Nw. U. L. REV. 1097, 1109-28 (2009); Clean Air Act, 42
U.S.C. §7543(b)(1), (e)(2)(A) (2012); Ann E. Carison, Regulatory Capacity and
State Environmental Leadership: California's Climate Policy, 24 FORDHAM
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experimentation with business needs for protection against too many
standards.23
Building on this legislative grant, and fighting off federal
preemption suits, California ran with this authority to help develop
not just car standards for conventional pollutants that have spread
well beyond California and become industry standard, but also, in
effect, fuel economy standards that recently were adopted by
Congress on a national scale. Most recently, Californians literally
voted to remain at the vanguard, defeating a referendum that would
have ended California's experiment with a cap-and-trade approach to
- 24
mitigating carbon dioxide emissions.
That experiment moves
forward an effort at mitigation that was unable to withstand cost and
effectiveness objections when proponents sought to have it adopted
as federal law.25
Cost and effectiveness, in fact, are often obstacles to the adoption
of federal enviromnental responses. Indeed, one way of thinking
about California's role in One Green America is this: California has
bridged the gap between an America divided over whether a
regulatory response would cost too much given its benefits by
showing costs were less than might have been claimed by industry
while benefits were substantial. In sum, California has and can help
L. REV. 63, 64 (2013) (discussing how California has been able to pass
ambitious legislation and implement a regulatory program of vast and complex
scope.).
23. See, e.g., E. Donald Elliott, Bruce A. Ackerman & John C. Millian, Tow ard
a Theory of Statutory Evolution: The Federalizationof Environmental Law, 1 J. L.
ECON. & ORG. 313, 326 (1985) (explaining that private industry responded to
"inconsistent and increasingly rigorous state laws" by pursuing federal
environmental legislation).
24. During the 2010 elections, Californians voted by a 61%-31% margin against
Proposition 23, which would have suspended the implementation of Assembly Bill
32 (the state's 2006 emissions-regulation and cap-and-trade law) until
unemployment rates remained at 5.5% or lower for four fiscal quarters. See Margot
Roosevelt, Prop. 23 Battle Marks New Era in Environmental Politics, L.A. TIMES
(Nov. 4, 2010), available at http:/articles.latimes.com/2010/nov/04/local/la-meglobal-warming-20101104; Colin Sullivan & Debra Kahn, Voters Reject 2-Sided
Assault on Climate Law, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 3., 2010), available at
http://vww.nvtimes.com/cwire/2010/1 1/03/03climatewire-voters-reject-2-sidedassault-on-climate-law- 13 439.htm l?pagewanted all.
25. See John M. Broder, Cap and Trade Loses Its Standing as Energy Policy of
Choice,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Mar.
25,
2010),
available
at
http://,ww.nvtimes.com/2010/03/26/science/earth/26climate.html.
EiNVTL.
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teach a skeptical nation when it is in fact worth it. As has been
repeatedly observed, it is often unclear what costs of new regulation
will be: much of the relevant data is provided by parties with
economic interests opposed to regulation, 26 and there is a long history
of over-estimating costs.27 On the other side of the equation,
environmental problems are highly technical, relying on the complex
interplay of physical, economic and political and psychological
phenomena. Hence, it is not obvious how well any program will
work.2 8 Uncertainties over cost and effectiveness are enough to deter
action at a national level, and but for California acting and generating
important additional information, all that might remain would be
differences of opinion and overall a lack of the consensus needed to
move ahead. Other states are also "progressive" on environmental
issues, but California, by virtue of the size of its economy, market
and population and the sophistication of its bureaucracies and the
political support for environmental regulatory innovation, is unique. 29
One of the questions that remains largely unexplored is why
California politics are so supportive of the state playing this role
between a divided America and One Green America. It may be path
dependence. It may be that the development of a cultural identity
and self-image among Californians at this point is self-generating.
Sophisticated agencies such as CARB may become forces in their
own right for ongoing policy innovation. Or it could be that the
economic interests of the key players in key California industries
26. See Thomas 0. McGarity & Ruth Ruttenberg, Counting the Cost of Health,
Safety, and Environmental Regulation, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1997, 1998 (2002) (noting
that "in preparing regulatory impact assessments for proposed rules, agencies are
heavily dependent upon the regulated entities for information about compliance
costs.").

27. Id. (explaining that because regulatees know "that the agencies are less
likely to impose regulatory options with high price tags ... or to support them
during the review process ...

[those] ... regulatees have every incentive to err on

the high side," and often project costs that are higher "by orders of magnitude" than
actual costs).

28. See Stephen Clowney, Environmental Ethics and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 18
FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 105, 119-24 (2006) (explaining the shortcomings of the

environmental cost-benefit analysis process). For a discussion of the psychological
barriers to taking action with certain costs to realize uncertain benefits (or to avoid
uncertain costs), see David A. Dana, A Behavioral Economic Defense of the
Precautionary Principle., 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 1315, 1320-26 (2003).
29. See Carlson, supra note 22, at 1138-44.
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such as entertainment and high technology are consistent with, or at
least not directly threatened, by stringent environmental regulation.
IV. CLIMATE CHANGE THAT WE CAN SEE

Climate change is not new, nor is the debate over whether there
should be a federal or national response, and if so what that response
should be. One possible discontinuity in the debate, however, is that
the effects of climate change or at least the possible effects - giant
storms, heat waves, drought, flooding - seem to be more apparent
and more certain to continue. 30 The need to adapt to climate change to continually adapt - seems now beyond question. So one question
of interest is, how may or should climate change adaptation affect the
discourse of environmental federalism?
One could see climate change adaptation pulling the country apart
- adding to disunity - or creating a stronger felt need for national
cohesion and national policy. On the one hand, some regions of the
country will be more adversely affected by climate change and hence
in need of taking greater proactive and reactive measures.3 That fact
could translate into a kind of state-oriented isolationism, where, for
example, Midwesterners and their political representatives balk at
paying the costs of increasing sea level.32 And, indeed, the
30. For an overview of anticipated climate events, see CLIMATE CHANGE 2007:
SYNTHESIS REPORT 53 (2007), available at http://www.ipcc.clipdflassessmentreport/ar4/syr/ar4syr.pdf
31. See, e.g. Kenneth Strzepek, Gary Yohe, James Neumann, & Brent Boehlert,
Characterizing Changes in Drought Risk for the United States from Climate
Change,
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(2010),

available

at

http:/iopscience.iop.org/1748-9326/5/4/044012/pdf/1748-9326 5 4 044012.pdf
(showing that projected drought frequency will dramatically increase relative to
20th century levels in the South and Southwest, but will actually decrease over 20th
century levels in parts of the Upper Midwest); SYNTHESIS AND ASSESSMENT
PRODUCT 4.1: COASTAL SENSITIVITY TO SEA-LEVEL RISE: A FOCUS ON THE MID-

ATLANTIC

REGION

18-21

(2009),

available

at

http://,ww.climatescience.gov/Library/sap/sap4-1/final-report/sap4-1-final-reportall.pdf (explaining that sea levels in the Mid-Atlantic and Gulf Coast regions are
rising far more quickly than in New England and parts of the Pacific Coast, placing
these regions at higher risk of adverse impacts including flooding. wetland loss.
and aquifer salinization).
32. The January 4, 2013 House vote to fund flood insurance for Hurricane
Sandy victims illustrates this pattern. 67 members of the House voted against the
insurance measure. Critics of the measure characterized their opposition in fiscal
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commentary on climate change adaptation has emphasized its local
character, and the leading political actors to date have been states and
even more so, localities.3 3 On the other hand, the reality of storms,
heat waves, flooding and droughts has been that there has been an
invariable provision of federal aid, in cash outlays as well as services.
It is almost unimaginable that there will not be more federal
expenditure to address effects associated with climate change over
the coming decades. That gives rise to what I think is the most
interesting question: will the usual deference to "localism" and state
and local authority in land use planning and management fade as the
federal financial stake in climate change adaptation increases? Will
there be more federal pressure and even federal law actually
requiring sensible zoning and building standards in areas near the
seashore?3 4 Will the federal government not just stop subsidizing
policy terms, but geographic factors may have played a role: of the "no" voters,
only four represented districts in Mid-Atlantic states, and five represented districts
with ocean coastline. The vast majority "no" voters (including former Vice
Presidential Candidate Paul Ryan) hailed from the Midwest, Great Plains and
inland South. See Raymond Hernandez, Congress Passes 59. 7 Billion in Relieffor
Hurricane Sandy Victims, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14., 2013., at A14, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/05/nyregion/house-passes-9-7-billion-in-relieffor-hurricane-sandy-victims.html? r=0; House Vote 7 - Passes $9.7 Billion in
Hurricane
Sandy
Relief,
N.Y.
TIMES,
http://politics.nytimes.com/congress/votes/ 113 /house/ 1/7. Many of those voting no
had previously sought disaster aid for their own districts. See Jennifer Oldham &
Craig Giroux, Republicans Called Hypocrites Asking Own Aid -Not Sandy's,
BLOOMBERG (Jan. 18, 2013), available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/201301-18/republicans-called-hypocrites-asking-own-aid-not-sandy-s.htini.
33. New York, Baltimore, and Washington, D.C. were members of the plaintiff
class in Massachusetts v. E.P.A, 549 U.S. 497 (2007). Boulder, Colorado enacted
the nation's first carbon tax in 2007, and the Bay Area followed suit the following
year. Jenni Sumner, Lori Bird, & Hillary Smith, Carbon Taxes: A Review of
Experience and Policy Design Considerations, NATIONAL RENEWABLE ENERGY
LABORATORY
14-15,
17
(2009),
available
at

http://www.nrel.gov/docs/f10osti/47312.pdf. Other cities have drafted climate
change adaptation and mitigation plans. For a comprehensive listing of such plans
(updated in October 2012), see UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY,

CLIMATE

CHANGE

ACTION

PLANS,

available

at

http://www.epa.gov/statelocalclimate/local/local-examples/action-plans.htnl1tall
(last visited Jan. 17, 2013).
34. See generally John R. Nolon, Shifting Paradigms Transform Environmental
and Land Use Law: The Emergence of the Law of Sustainable Development, 24
FORDHAM ENVTL.

L. REV. 242 (2013) (proposing a more integrated and
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excessive construction in flood-prone areas but take action to stop
states from providing subsidies?
Climate change adaptation will not only translate into greater calls
on the federal budget but also a greater realization of the scarcity of
water in a large portion of the country.35 As water in some regions
becomes scarcer, there may well be calls to consider how to allocate
it in order to maximize social welfare; reliance on a patchwork of
state laws and state institutions, without much in the way of interstate
coordination or federal lawv, may no longer seem acceptable in the
face of water shortages and needs to transfonm practices regarding
water usage.36 Thus, climate change adaptation may have a
federalizing effect on local land use law and state and local water law
and, perhaps, the assumption that land use and water law must be, as
a nonnative matter, state and local matters, will fade.
V. POLARIZATION AND HOMOGENIZATION IN AMERICAN CULTURE
AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR ONE GREEN AMERICA
It is impossible not to hear and read about increasing polarization
in the United States. We are told that Americans are increasingly
divided by ideology and political party, and that their views on
almost everything correspond to the ideological and party
comprehensive response at the federal level, particularly with respect to land use
regulation).
35. See Alexandra B. Klass, Climate Change and the Convergence of
Environmental and Energy Law, 24 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 180, 182 (2013)
(discussing climate change as the focal point in environmental law today, as well as
the important role of states in responding to that issue and arguing that climate
change cannot be solely discussed with traditional normative tools, but also energy
law).
36. This may be true even outside the historically arid West. The long-running
dispute surrounding water use in the three-state Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint
("ACF") river system illustrates how fraught interstate water negotiations can
become. The Army Corps of Engineers manages a system of dams on the ACF.
Population growth in Greater Atlanta has led Georgia to press the Corps for more
water for urban use, while Florida and Alabama, seeking to secure ACF water for
local consumption and use (as well as for navigation and the maintenance of the
Apalachicola estuary) have challenged these requests. Years of negotiation and
litigation have failed to produce a durable agreement between the states. See
Strzepek et al., supra note 31, at 1; see also J.B. Ruh1, WYater Wars, Eastern Style:

Divvying up the Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-FlintRiver Basin, 131 J. CONTEMP.
WATER RESEARCH AND EDUC. 47, 49-50 (2005).
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affiliation. The cultural cognition scholarship envisions a few
Americas seeing everything, including scientific evidence, though
very different templates and offers no reason to imagine a
convergence in perceptions.3 We are told that we are increasingly
living next to, working alongside and socializing with people who
think as we do. One question is whether and how this polarization,
assuming it is real, undermines a federal role in addressing
environmental problems inasmuch as such a role is based - in part on shared normative commitments as to what America means and
what Americans as such have a right to demand from their fellow
citizens and government.
The polarization thesis surely has a basis, but it may be overstated.
The hope of one America - not Blue or Red - is that it is overstated.
37. See generally Bill Bishop, THE BIG SORT (2008); see also Political

Segregation: The Big Sort., THE ECONOMIST, Jun. 21, 2008, at 41-42, available at
http://www.economist.com/node/11581447 (discussing Bishop's conclusion that
increasing polarization has led to cultural "balkanization" with geographic, social,
and political dimensions); Robert J. Samuelson, Political Perils of a 'Big Sort',
WASHINGTON

POST,

Aug.

6,

2008

at

A17,

available

at

http://www.washingtonpost.com/vpdyn/content/article/2008/08/05/AR2008080502933 pf.html
(noting
that
notwithstanding some areas of convergence and lasting broad-based agreement in
public opinion, the "vital center is becoming slowly disenfranchised.").
38. Professor Kahan, et al. note that scientific consensus or near-consensus with
respect to climate change and a range of other issues, including "the safety of
nuclear power ...the toxicity of arsenic, radon, and other groundwater
chemicals. . [and] the health consequences of vaccinating school girls against the
human papillonavirus" has "failed to achieve anything close to that among
members of the general public." Dan Kahan, Hank Jenkins-Smith, & Donald
Braman, Cultural Cognition of Scientific Consensus, 14-2 J. RISK RES. 147, 147
(2011). They posit that "[t]lhe problem., it seems, is not that members of the public
are unexposed or indifferent to what scientists say., but rather that they disagree
about what scientists are telling them." Id at 148. Disagreement on climate change
is especially pronounced: a 2010 public opinion poll shows that 79% of Democrats
believe in human-induced global warming, while 70% of Republican tea party
supporters do not. Wide PartisanDivide Over Global Warming, PEW RESEARCH
CENTER
(Oct.
27,
2010),
available
at
http://www.pewresearch.org/2010/10/27/wide-partisan-divide-over-globalwarming/. Bishop argues that ideological and political differences encourage (and
subsequently reinforce) retreat into discrete, inward-facing spheres of public life,
further impeding the search for common ground. See THE ECONOMIST., supra note
37 ("'We now live in a giant feedback loop,' says Mr. Bishop ... [and Americans
increasingly] 'find other Americans to be culturally incomprehensible."').
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But taken as a given that there is more polarization, it is also not clear
how this polarization tracks onto environnental federalism debates.
We may be in the process of becoming more polarized, but it is less
clear that the polarization is regional: intrastate differences may be
more pronounced than before, not interstate ones. As states like
Virginia urbanize, there may be more similarities across states than
ever before, but more differences between particular localities and
areas within the same state. Moreover, even with polarization, there
may be con-vergences mixed in with divergences. Climate change has
become an ideologically charged and hence polarizing issue, but it is
much less clear that protecting public health from smog is polarizing.
The available polling data mostly is not focused on regional
differences and, to the extent it addresses environmental issues,
seems overwhelmingly focused on climate change. 9 Another
question is whether polarization is reversible, which raises an
important question as to why we witness, to the extent we do,
increased polarization.
CONCLUSION

The debate over environmental federalism has been a mainstay in
environmental legal discourse for decades, and will certainly remain
so. The multiplicity of the values at stake in "the environment" and
both pollution control and conservation ensure we will not see an
allocation of authority among the federal and state authorities that is
theoretically elegant or anything other than messy. There have been
notable continuities in the history of environental federalism, some
less encouraging (the federal clumsiness at addressing obvious
39. See, e.g., Jeffrey M. Jones, Americans W1ant Next President to Prioritize

Jobs,
Corruption,
GALLUP
(Jul.
30,
2012),
http://wwiw,.gallup.com/poll/156347/americans-next-president-prioritize-jobscorruption.aspx (national survey which included a question about whether the next
president should prioritize "environmental concerns, such as global warming");
Jeffrey Jones., In U.S., Many Environmental Issues at 20-Year Low Concern,
GALLUP
(Mar.
16,
2010),
available
at
http://www.gallup.com/poll/126716/environmental-issues-vear-low-concern.aspx
(poll addressing several environmental issues, but only on a national scale); More
Say There is Solid Evidence of Global Warming, PEW RESEARCH CENTER FOR
PEOPLE AND THE PRESS (Oct. 14, 2012), available at www.peoplepress.org/2012/10/15/more-say-there-is-solid-evidence-of-global-warming/
(national poll).
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transboundary pollution and judicial impediments to federal efforts),
some encouraging (the use of California as a cost and effectiveness
laboratory). How changes in the physical world due to climate
change, and attitudinal changes due to an ideological and partisan
polarization, will affect the discourse and reality of environmental
federalism are questions that warrant attention by scholars as we
continue to work out whether we have and should have one Green
America.
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